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Abstract
A simple model of corruption that takes into account the effect of the interaction
of a large number of agents by both rational decision making and myopic behavior
is developed. Its stationary version turns out to be a rare example of an exactly
solvable model of mean-field-game type. The results show clearly how the presence
of interaction (including social norms) influences the spread of corruption.
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1 Introduction
Analysis of the spread of corruption in bureaucracy is a well recognized area of the ap-
plication of game theory, which attracted attention of many researchers. General surveys
can be found in [2], [26], [38]. In his Prize lecture [25], L. Hurwicz gives a nice introduction
in laymen terms of various problems arising in an attempt to find out ’who will guard
the guardians?’ and which mechanisms can be exploited to enforce the legal behavior?
In a series of papers [34],[35] the authors analyze the dynamic game, where entrepreneurs
have to apply to a set of bureaucrats (in a prescribed order) in order to obtain permis-
sion for their business projects; for an approval the bureaucrats ask for bribes with their
amounts being considered as strategies of the bureaucrats. The existence of an interme-
diary undertaking the contacts with bureaucrats for a fee may moderate the outcomes
of this game referred to as petty corruption, as each bureaucrat is assumed to ask for
a small bribe, so that the large bureaucratic losses of entrepreneurs occur from a large
number of bureaucrats. This is a kind of extension of the classical ultimatum game, as
if an entrepreneur declines to pay the required graft, the game stops. In the series of
works [46], [47], [41] the authors develop an hierarchical model of corruption, where the
inspectors of each level audit the inspectors of the previous level and report their finding
to the inspector of the next upper level. For a graft they may choose to make a falsi-
fied report. The inspector of the highest level is assumed to be honest but very costly
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for the government. The strategy of the government is in the optimal determination of
the audits on various levels with the objective to achieve the minimal level of corruption
with the minimal costs. Paper [44] develops a simple model to get an insight into the
problem of when unifying efforts lead to strength or corruption. In paper [39] the model
of a network corruption game is introduced and analyzed with the dynamics of corrupted
services between the entrepreneurs and corrupted bureaucrats propagating via the chain
of intermediary. In [40] the dichotomy between public monitoring and governmental cor-
ruptive pressure on the growth of economy was modeled. In [37] an evolutionary model
of corruption is developed for ecosystem management and bio-diversity conservation. Let
us mention also the research on the political aspects of corruption developing around the
Acton’s dictum that ’power corrupts’, where the elections serve usually as a major tool of
public control, see [16] and references therein. Closely related are the so-called inspection
games, see surveys e. g. in [4], [3], [30], [33].
On the other hand, one of the central trend in the modern theory of games and optimal
control is related to the analysis of systems with a large number of agents providing a
strong link with the study of interacting particles in statistical mechanics. Therefore it is
natural to start applying these methods to the games of corruption, which until recently
were mostly studied by the classical game-theoretic models with two or three players. The
model of corruption with a large number of agents interacting in a myopic way (agents
try to copy a more successful behavior of their peers) was developed in [29] as an example
of a general model of pressure and resistance that extends the approach of evolutionary
games to players interacting in response to a pressure executed by a distinguished big
player (a principal). In the present paper we consider each player of a large group to be
a rational optimizer thus bringing the model to the realm of mean-field games.
Mean-field games present a quickly developing area of the game theory. It was initiated
by Lasry-Lions [36] and Huang-Malhame-Caines [22], [23], [24], see [5], [8], [20], [19], [11]
for recent surveys, as well as [13], [12], [14], [17], [31] and references therein.
New trends concern the theory of mean-field games with a major player [42], the
numeric analysis [1], the risk-sensitive games [45], the games with a discrete state space,
see [18], [6] and references therein, as well as the games and control with a centralized
controller of a large pool of agents, see [15] and [28].
Here we develop a concrete stationary mean-field game model with a finite state space
of individual players describing the distribution of corrupted and honest agents under
the pressure of both an incorruptible governmental representative (often referred to, in
literature, as ’benevolent principal’, see e. g. [2]) and the ’social norms’ of the society.
This model represents a rare example of being exactly solvable, showing in particular
the non-uniqueness of solutions which is widely discussed in the general mean-field game
theory. On the other hand, this example can be used as a natural toy-model to analyze the
link between stationary and dynamic models, again a nontrivial problem widely discussed
in the general theory (though we shall not go in this direction here). From the point of
view of the application to corruption, our contribution is in a systematic study of the
interaction of a large number of (potentially corrupted) agents, each one of them being
considered as a rational optimizer. This mean-field-interaction component of our model
can be used to enrich the settings of the majority of papers cited above.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections we present our model and
formulate the main results. Then we discuss its shortcomings and perspectives. The two
final sections contain the proofs.
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2 The model and the objectives of analysis
An agent is supposed to be in one of the three states: honest H , corrupted C, reserved
R, where R is the reserved job of low salary that an agent receives as a punishment if her
corrupted behavior is discovered.
The change between H and C is subject to the decisions of the agents (though the
precise time of the execution of their intent is noisy) the change from C to R are random
with distributions depending on the level of the efforts (say, a budget used) b of the
principal (a government representative) invested in chasing a corrupted behavior, the
change R to H (so-to-say, a new recruitment) may be possible and is included as a
random event with a certain rate.
Let nH , nC , nR denote the numbers of agents in the corresponding states with N =
nH + nC + nR the total number of agents. By a state of the system we shall mean either
the 3-vector n = (nH , nC , nR) or its normalized version x = (xH , xC , xR) = n/N .
The control parameter u of each player in states H or C may have two values, 0 and
1, meaning that the player is happy with her state (H or C) or she prefers to switch one
to another; there is no control in the state R. When the updating decision 1 is made,
the updating effectively occurs with some rates λ. The recovery rate, that is the rate of
change from R to H (we assume that once recruited the agents start by being honest) is
a given constant r.
Apart from taking a rational decision to swap H and C, an honest agent can be
pushed to become corruptive by her corruptive peers, the effect being proportional to the
fraction of corrupted agents with certain coefficient qinf , which is analogous to the infection
rate in epidemiologic models. On the other hand, the honest agents can contribute to
chasing and punishing corrupted behavior, this effect of a desirable social norm being
proportional to the fraction of honest agents with certain coefficient qsoc. The presence of
the coefficients qinf , qsoc reflecting the social interaction, makes the dynamics of individual
agents dependent on the distribution of other agents, thus bringing the model to the
setting of mean-field games. It is of our major concern to find out how the presence of
interaction influences the spread of corruption.
Thus if all agents use the strategy uH , uC ∈ {0, 1} and the efforts of the principle is b,
the evolution of the state x is clearly given by the ODE

x˙R = (b+ qsocxH)xC − rxR,
x˙H = rxR − λ(xHuH − xCuC)− qinfxHxC ,
x˙C = −(b+ qsocxH)xC + λ(xHuH − xCuC) + qinfxHxC .
(1)
It is instructive to see how this ODE can be rigorously deduced from the Markov
model of interaction. Namely, if all agents use the strategy uH , uC ∈ {0, 1} and the efforts
of the principle is b, the generator of the Markov evolution on the states n is (where the
unchanged values in the arguments of F on the r.h.s are omitted)
LNF (nH , nC , nR) = nC(b+ qsoc
nH
N
)F (nC − 1, nR + 1) + nRrF (nR − 1, nH + 1)
+nH(λuH + qinf
nC
N
)F (nH − 1, nC + 1) + λnCuCF (nC − 1, nH + 1).
For any N , this generator describes a Markov chain on the finite state space {n =
(nH , nC , nR) : nH + nC + nR = N}, where any agent, independently of others, can be re-
cruited with rate r (if in state R) or change from C to H or vice versa if desired (with rate
3
λ), and where the change of the state due to binary interactions are taken into account
by the terms containing qsoc and qinf .
In terms of x the generator LNF takes the form
LNF (nH , nC , nR) = xC(b+ qsocxH)F (x− eC/N + eR/N) + xRrF (x− eR/N + eH/N)
+ xH(λuH + qinfxC)F (x− eH/N + eC/N) + λxCuCF (x− eC/N + eH/N), (2)
where {ej} is the standard basis in R
3. If F is a differentiable function, the generator LN
turns to
LF (x) = xC(b+ qsocxH)
(
∂F
∂xR
−
∂F
∂xC
)
+ xRr
(
∂F
∂xH
−
∂F
∂xR
)
+ xH(λuH + qinfxC)
(
∂F
∂xC
−
∂F
∂xH
)
+ λxCuC
(
∂F
∂xH
−
∂F
∂xC
)
(3)
in the limitN →∞. This is a first order partial differential operator and its characteristics
are given by the ODE (1).
This Markov model is important not only as a tool to derive (1), but it helps to under-
stand the dynamics of individual players (in statistical mechanics terms corresponding to
the so-called tagged particles), which are central for a mean-field game analysis of agents
trying to deviate from the behavior of a crowd. Namely, if x(t) and b(t) are given, the
dynamics of each individual player is the Markov chain on the 3 states with the generator

Lindg(R) = r(g(H)− g(R))
Lindg(H) = (λuindH + qinfxC)(g(C)− g(H))
Lindg(C) = λuindC (g(H)− g(C)) + (b+ qsocxH)(g(R)− g(C))
(4)
depending on the individual control uind ∈ {0, 1}, so that g˙ = Lindg is the Kolmogorov
backward equation of this chain.
Assume that an employed agent receives a wage wH per unit of time and, if corrupted,
an average payoff wC (that includes wH plus some additional illegal reward); she has to
pay a fine f when her illegal behavior is discovered; the reserved wage for fired agents
is wR. If the distribution of other payers is x(t) = (xR, xH , xC)(t), the HJB equation
describing the optimal payoff g = gt (starting at time t with time horizon T ) of an agent
is

g˙(R) + wR + r(g(H)− g(R)) = 0
g˙(H) + wH +max
u
(λu+ qinfxC)(g(C)− g(H)) = 0
g˙(C) + wC − (b+ qsocxH)f +max
u
(λu(g(H)− g(C)) + (b+ qsocxH)(g(R)− g(C)) = 0.
(5)
Therefore, starting with some control
ucom(t) = (ucomC (t), u
com
H (t)),
used by all players, we can find the dynamics x(t) from equation (1) (with ucom used for
u). Then each individual should solve the Markov control problem (5) thus finding the
individually optimal strategy
uind(t) = (uindC (t), u
ind
H (t)).
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The basic MFG consistency equation can now be explicitly written as
uind(t) = ucom(t). (6)
Instead of analyzing this rather complicated dynamic problem, we shall look for a
simpler and practically more relevant problem of consistent stationary strategies.
There are two standard stationary problems arising from HJB (5), one being the search
for the average payoff
g = lim
T→∞
1
T
∫ T
0
gt dt
for long period games, and another the search for discounted optimal payoff. The first is
governed by the solutions of HJB of the form (T − t)µ+ g, linear in t (with µ describing
the optimal average payoff), so that g satisfies the stationary HJB equation:


wR + r(g(H)− g(R)) = µ
wH +max
u
(λu+ qinfxC)(g(C)− g(H)) = µ
wC − (b+ qsocxH)f +max
u
(λu(g(H)− g(C)) + (b+ qsocxH)(g(R)− g(C)) = µ,
(7)
and the discounted optimal payoff (with the discounting coefficient δ) satisfies the sta-
tionary HJB


wR + r(g(H)− g(R)) = δg(R)
wH +max
u
(λu+ qinfxC)(g(C)− g(H)) = δg(H)
wC − (b+ qsocxH)f +max
u
(λu(g(H)− g(C)) + (b+ qsocxH)(g(R)− g(C)) = δg(C).
(8)
The analysis of these two settings is mostly analogous (as they are in some sense
equivalent, see e. g. [43]). We shall concentrate on the first one.
For a fixed b, the stationary MFG consistency problem is in finding (x, uC , uH) =
(x, uC(x), uH(x)), where x is the stationary point of evolution (1), that is

(b+ qsocxH)xC − rxR = 0
rxR − λ(xHuH(x)− xCuC(x))− qinfxHxC = 0
− (b+ qsocxH)xC + λ(xHuH(x)− xCuC(x)) + qinfxHxC = 0,
(9)
where uC(x), uH(x) give maximum in the solution to (7). Thus x is a fixed point of the
limiting dynamics of the distribution of large number of agents such that the corresponding
stationary control is individually optimal subject to this distribution.
Remark 1. Notice that our stationary MFG consistency is close to the concept of the
Wardrop equilibria, see e. g. [21], but is quite different nevertheless.
Fixed points can practically model a stationary behavior only if they are stable. Thus
we are interested in stable solutions (x, uC , uH) = (x, uC(x), uH(x)) to the stationary
MFG consistency problem, where a solution is stable if the corresponding stationary
distribution x = (xR, xH , xC) is a stable equilibrium to (1) (with uC , uH fixed by this
solution). As mentioned above, our major concern is to find out how the presence of
interaction (specified by the coefficients qsoc, qinf) affects the stable equilibria.
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3 Results
Our first result describe explicitly all solutions to the stationary MFG consistency problem
stated above and the second result deals with the stability of these solutions.
We shall say that in a solution to the stationary MFG consistency problem the optimal
individual behavior is corruption if uC = 0, uH = 1: if you are corrupt stay corrupt, and
if you are honest, start corrupted behavior as soon as possible; the optimal individual
behavior is honesty if uC = 1, uH = 0: if you are honest stay honest, if you are involved
in corruption try to clean yourself from corruption as soon as possible.
The basic assumptions on our coefficients are
λ > 0, r > 0, b > 0, f ≥ 0, qsoc ≥ 0, qinf ≥ 0, wC > wH > wR ≥ 0. (10)
The key parameter for our model turns out to be the quantity
x¯ =
1
qsoc
[
r(wC − wH)
wH − wR + rf
− b
]
(11)
(which can take values ±∞ if qsoc = 0).
Theorem 3.1. Assume (10).
(i) If x¯ > 1, then there exists a unique solution x∗ = (x∗R, x
∗
C , x
∗
H) to the stationary
MFG problem (9), (7), where
x∗C =
(1− x∗H)r
r + b+ qsocx∗H
(12)
and x∗H is the unique solution on the interval (0, 1) of the quadratic equation Q(xH) = 0,
where
Q(xH) = [(r + λ)qsoc − rqinf ]x
2
H + [r(qinf − qsoc) + λr + λb+ rb]xH − rb. (13)
Under this solution the optimal individual behavior is corruption: uC = 0, uH = 1.
(ii) If x¯ < 1, there may be 1,2 or 3 solutions to the stationary MFG problem (9), (7).
Namely, the point xH = 1, xC = xR = 0 is always a solution, under which the optimal
individual behavior is being honest: uC = 1, uH = 0.
Moreover, if
max(x¯, 0) ≤
b+ λ
qinf − qsoc
< 1, (14)
then there is another solution with the optimal individual behavior being honest, that is
uC = 1, uH = 0:
x∗∗H =
b+ λ
qinf − qsoc
, x∗∗C =
r(qinf − qsoc − b− λ)
(r + b)qinf + (λ− r)qsoc
. (15)
Finally, if
x¯ > 0, Q(x¯) ≥ 0, (16)
there is a solution with the corruptive optimal behavior of the same structure as in (i),
that is, with x∗H being the unique solution to Q(xH) = 0 on (0, x¯] and x
∗
C given by (12).
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Remark 2. As seen by inspection, Q[(b+λ)/(qinf − qsoc)] > 0 (if qinf − qsoc > 0), so that
for x¯ slightly less than x∗∗H = (b+λ)/(qinf−qsoc) one has also Q(x¯) > 0, in which case one
really has three points of equilibria given by x∗H , x
∗∗
H , xH = 1 with 0 < x
∗ < x¯ < x∗∗ < 1.
Remark 3. In case of the stationary problem arising from the discounting payoff, that
is from equation (8), the role of the classifying parameter x¯ from (11) is played by the
quantity
x¯ =
1
qsoc
[
(r + δ)(wC − wH)
wH − wR + (r + δ)f
− b
]
. (17)
Theorem 3.2. Assume (10).
(i) The solution x∗ = (x∗R, x
∗
C , x
∗
H) (given by Theorem 3.1) with individually optimal
behavior being corruption is stable if
−
λqsoc
r
≤ qsoc − qinf ≤
rqinf + (r + b)(br + rλ+ bλ)
r2
. (18)
(ii) Suppose x¯ < 1. If qinf − qsoc ≤ 0 or
qinf − qsoc > 0,
b+ λ
qinf − qsoc
> 1,
then xH = 1 is the unique stationary MFG solution with individually optimal strategy
being honest; and this solution is stable. If (14) holds, there are two stationary MFG
solution with individually optimal strategy being honest, one with xH = 1 and another
with xH = x
∗∗
H given by (15); the first solution is unstable and the second is stable.
We are not presenting necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of solutions
with optimally corrupted behavior. Condition (18) is only sufficient, but it covers a rea-
sonable range of parameters where the ’epidemic’ spread of corruption and social cleaning
are effects of comparable order.
As a trivial consequence of our theorems we can conclude that in the absence of
interaction, that is for qinf = qsoc = 0, the corruption is individually optimal if
wC − wR ≥ bf + (wH − wR)(1 +
b
r
) (19)
and honesty is individually optimal otherwise (which is of course a reformulation of the
standard result for a basic model of corruption, see e. g. [2]). In the first case the unique
equilibrium is
x∗H =
rb
λr + λb+ rb
, x∗C =
r(1− x∗H)
r + b
, (20)
and in the second case the unique equilibrium is xH = 1. Both are stable.
4 Discussion
The results above show clearly how the presence of interaction (including social norms)
influences the spread of corruption. When qinf = qsoc = 0, one has one equilibrium
that corresponds to corrupted or honest behavior depending on a certain relation (19)
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between the parameters of the game. If social norms or ’epidemic’ myopic behavior are
allowed in the model, which is quite natural for a realistic process, the situation becomes
much more complicated. In particular, in a certain range of parameters, one has two
stable equilibria, one corresponding to an optimally honest and another to an optimally
corrupted behavior. This means in particular that similar strategies of a principal (defined
by the choice of parameters b, f, wH) can lead to quite different outcomes depending on the
initial distributions of honest-corrupted agents or even on the small random fluctuations
in the process of evolution.
The coefficients b and f enter exogenously in our system and can be used as tools for
shifting the (precalculated) stable equilibria in the desired direction. These coefficients
are not chosen strategically, which is an appropriate assumption for situations when the
principal may have only poor information about the overall distribution of states of the
agents. It is of course natural to extend the model by treating the principal as a strategic
optimizer who chooses b (or even can choose f) in each state to optimize certain payoff.
This would place the model in the group of MFG models with a major player, which is
actively studied in the current literature.
Classifying agents as corrupted and honest only is a strong simplification of reality. In
the spirit of [41] and [29] it is natural to consider the hierarchy i = 1, · · · , n of the possible
positions of agents in a bureaucratic staircase with both basic wages wiH and the illegal
payoff wiC in the corresponding states Hi and Ci increasing with i. Once a corruptive
behavior of an agent from state Ci is detected, she is supposed to be downgraded to the
reserved state R = H0, and the upgrading from i to i + 1 can be modeled as a random
event with a given rate. This multi-layer model of corruption could bring insights on the
spread of corruption among the representatives of the different levels of power.
Theoretically, the main questions left open by our analysis are the precise link between
the stationary and dynamic MFG solutions and the precise statement of the law o large
numbers. Namely, (i) Can we solve the dynamic MFG consistency problem (6) and
whether its solutions will approach the solutions of the stationary problems described
by our Theorems? (ii) Considering a stochastic game of N players in the Markov model
where each player evolves according to (4) with chosen control uC, uH and the distribution
xt reflects the aggregated distribution so obtained, do our stationary MFG solutions
represent approximate Nash equilibria to this game? This latter question is an MFG
version of the well known problem of evolutionary game theory about the correspondence
between the results of taking limits N →∞ and t→∞ in a different order, where rather
deep results were obtained, see e. g. [10] and references therein.
5 Proof of Theorem 3.1
Clearly solutions to (7) are defined up to an additive constant. Thus we can and will
assume that g(R) = 0. Moreover, we can reduce the analysis to the case wR = 0 by
subtracting it from all equations of (7) and thus shifting by wR the values wH , wC , µ.
Under these simplifications, the first equation to (7) is µ = rg(H), so that (7) becomes
the system{
wH + λmax(g(C)− g(H), 0) + qinfxC(g(C)− g(H)) = rg(H)
wC − (b+ qsocxH)f + λmax(g(H)− g(C), 0)− (b+ qsocxH)g(C) = rg(H)
(21)
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for the pair (g(H), g(C)) with µ = rg(H).
Assuming g(C) ≥ g(H), that is uC = 0, uH = 1, so that the corruptive behavior is
optimal, system (21) turns to{
wH + λ(g(C)− g(H)) + qinfxC(g(C)− g(H)) = rg(H)
wC − (b+ qsocxH)f − (b+ qsocxH)g(C) = rg(H).
(22)
Solving this system of two linear equations we get
g(C) =
(r + λ+ qinfxC)[wC − (b+ qsocxH)f ]− rwH
r(λ+ qinfxC + b+ qsocxH) + (λ+ qinfxC)(b+ qsocxH)
,
g(H) =
(λ+ qinfxC)[wC − (b+ qsocxH)f ] + (b+ qsocxH)wH
r(λ+ qinfxC + b+ qsocxH) + (λ+ qinfxC)(b+ qsocxH)
,
so that g(C) ≥ g(H) is equivalent to
wC − (b+ qsocxH)f ≥ wH
(
1 +
b+ qsocxH
r
)
,
or, in other words,
xH ≤
1
qsoc
[
r(wC − wH)
wH + rf
− b
]
, (23)
which by restoring wR (shifting wC , wH by wR) gives
xH ≤ x¯ =
1
qsoc
[
r(wC − wH)
wH − wR + rf
− b
]
. (24)
Since xH ∈ (0, 1), this is automatically satisfied if x¯ > 1, that is under the assumption of
(i). On the other hand, it definitely cannot hold if x¯ < 0.
Assuming g(C) ≤ g(H), that is uC = 1, uH = 0, so that the honest behavior is optimal,
system (21) turns to{
wH + qinfxC(g(C)− g(H)) = rg(H)
wC − (b+ qsocxH)f + λ(g(H)− g(C))− (b+ qsocxH)g(C) = rg(H).
(25)
Solving this system of two linear equations we get
g(C) =
(r + qinfxC)[wC − (b+ qsocxH)f ] + (λ− r)wH
r(λ+ qinfxC + b+ qsocxH) + qinfxC(b+ qsocxH)
g(H) =
qinfxC [wC − (b+ qsocxH)f ] + (λ+ b+ qsocxH)wH
r(λ+ qinfxC + b+ qsocxH) + qinfxC(b+ qsocxH)
so that g(C) ≤ g(H) is equivalent to the inverse of condition (23).
If g(C) ≥ g(H), that is uC = 0, uH = 1, the fixed point equation (9) becomes

(b+ qsocxH)xC − rxR = 0
rxR − λxH − qinfxHxC = 0
− (b+ qsocxH)xC + λxH + qinfxHxC = 0.
(26)
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Since xR = 1−xH−xC , the third equation is a consequence of the first two equations,
which yields the system
(b+ qsocxH)xC − r(1− xH − xC) = 0
r(1− xH − xC)− λxH − qinfxHxC = 0.
(27)
From the first equation we have
xC =
(1− xH)r
r + b+ qsocxH
. (28)
From this it is seen that if xH ∈ (0, 1) (as it should be), then also xC ∈ (0, 1) and
xC + xH =
r + xH(b+ qsocxH)
r + b+ qsocxH
∈ (0, 1).
Plugging xC in the second equation of (27) we find for xH the quadratic equation Q(xH) =
0 with Q given by (13).
Since Q(0) < 0 and Q(1) > 0, the equation Q(xH) = 0 has exactly one positive root
x∗H ∈ (0, 1). Hence x
∗
H satisfies (23) if and only if either x¯ > 1 (that is we are under the
assumption of (i)) or if (16) holds proving the last statement of (ii).
If g(C) ≤ g(H), that is uC = 1, uH = 0, the fixed point equation (9) becomes

(b+ qsocxH)xC − xRr = 0
xRr + λxC − qinfxHxC = 0
− xC(b+ qsocxH)− λxC + qinfxHxC = 0.
(29)
Again here xR = 1− xH − xC and the third equation is a consequence of the first two
equations, which yields the system{
(b+ qsocxH)xC − r(1− xH − xC) = 0
r(1− xH − xC) + λxC − qinfxHxC = 0.
(30)
From the first equation we again get (28). Plugging this xC in the second equation of
(27) we find the equation
r(1− xH) = (r − λ+ qinfxH)
(1− xH)r
r + b+ qinfxH
,
with two explicit solutions yielding the first and the second statements of (ii).
6 Proof of Theorem 3.2
(i) When individually optimal behavior is to be corrupted, that is uC = 0, uH = 1, system
(1) written in terms of (xH , xC) becomes{
x˙H = (1− xH − xC)r − λxH − qinfxHxC ,
x˙C = −xC(b+ qsocxH) + λxH + qinfxHxC .
(31)
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Written in terms of y = xH − x
∗
H , z = xC − x
∗
C it takes the form{
y˙ = −y(r + λ+ qinfx
∗
C)− z(r + qinfx
∗
H)− qinfyz,
z˙ = y[λ+ (qinf − qsoc)x
∗
C ] + z[x
∗
H(qinf − qsoc)− b]z + (qinf − qsoc)yz.
(32)
The condition of stability is the requirement that both eigenvalues of the linear ap-
proximation around the fixed point have real negative parts, or equivalently that the trace
of the linear approximation is negative and the determinant is positive:
x∗H(qinf − qsoc)− b− r − λ− qinfx
∗
C < 0,
λ(r + qsocx
∗
H + b)− rx
∗
H(qinf − qsoc) + br + x
∗
C [r(qinf − qsoc) + qinfb] > 0
(33)
(note that the quadratic terms in xC , xH cancel in the second inequality). By (12) this
rewrites in terms of x∗H as
[x∗H(qinf − qsoc)− b− r − λ](r + b+ qsocx
∗
H)− qinfr(1− x
∗
H) < 0,
[λ(r + qsocx
∗
H + b)− rx
∗
H(qinf − qsoc) + br](r + b+ qsocx
∗
H) + r(1− x
∗
H)[r(qinf − qsoc) + qinfb] > 0
or in a more concise form as
(x∗H)
2(qinf − qsoc)qsoc + x
∗
H [(qinf − qsoc)(2r + b)− qsoc(b+ λ)]− (r + b)(r + b+ λ)− rqinf < 0,
(x∗H)
2qsoc[(qinf − qsoc)r − λqsoc] + 2x
∗
H(r + b)[r(qinf − qsoc)r − λqsoc]
− r2(qinf − qsoc)− rbqinf − (r + b)(br + rλ+ bλ) < 0.
(34)
Let
0 ≤ qsoc − qinf ≤
rqinf + (r + b)(br + rλ+ bλ)
r2
.
Then it is seen directly that both inequalities in (34) hold trivially for any positive xH .
Assume now that
0 < r(qinf − qsoc) ≤ λqsoc.
Then the second condition in (34) again holds trivially for any positive xH . Moreover, it
follows from Q(x∗H) = 0 that
x∗H ≤
rb
r(qinf − qsoc) + λr + λb+ rb
≤ x˜ =
b
qinf − qsoc
.
Now the left hand side of the first inequality of (34) evaluated at x˜ is negative, because
it equals
−
bqsocλ
qinf − qsoc
− r2 − λ(r + b)− rqinf ,
and it is also negative when evaluated at x∗H ≤ x˜.
(ii) When individually optimal behavior is to be honest, that is uC = 1, uH = 0, system
(1) written in terms of (xH , xC) becomes
x˙H = (1− xH − xC)r + λxC − qinfxHxC ,
x˙C = −xC(b+ qsocxH)− λxC + qinfxHxC .
(35)
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To analyze the stability of the fixed point xH = 1, xC = 0 we write it in terms of xC and
y = 1− xH as
y˙ = −ry + xC(r − λ+ qinf )− qinfyxC ,
x˙C = xC(qinf − qsoc − λ− b)− yxC(qinf − qsoc).
According to the linear approximation, the fixed point y = 0, xC = 0 of this system is
stable if qinf − qsoc − λ− b < 0 proving the first statement in (ii).
Assume (14) holds. To analyze the stability of the fixed point x∗∗H we write system
(35) in terms of the variables
y = xH − x
∗∗
H = xH −
b+ λ
qinf − qsoc
, z = xC − x
∗∗
C = xC −
r(qinf − qsoc − b− λ)
(r + b)qinf + (λ− r)qsoc
,
which is
y˙ = −y
r[(r + qinf )(qinf − qsoc) + λqsoc]
(r + b)qinf + (λ− r)qsoc
− z
(r + b)qinf + (λ− r)qsoc
qinf − qsoc
− qinfyz,
z˙ = y
r(qinf − qsoc − b− λ)(qinf − qsoc)
(r + b)qinf + (λ− r)qsoc
+ yz.
The characteristic equation of the matrix of linear approximation is seen to be
ξ2 +
r[(r + qinf)(qinf − qsoc) + λqsoc]
(r + b)qinf + (λ− r)qsoc
ξ + r(qinf − qsoc − b− λ) = 0.
Under (14) both the free term and the coefficient at ξ are positive. Hence both roots have
negative real parts implying stability.
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